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"There can be no truer principle than this-that every individual of
the community at large has an equal right to the protection of
1
government."

"The majestic equality of the law [forbids] the rich as well as the
poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
bread.",

2

*
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1.
Alexander Hamilton, Address to the Constitutional Convention (June 29, 1787).
2.
ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYs ROUGE, ch. 7 (1894).
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THE EXTRA-LEGAL ORIGINS OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLE

This symposium seeks to explore contemporary issues and future
trends in equal protection jurisprudence. Where we are, in other words, and
where we are going. But it would also seem appropriate to ask where we
have been, and how did we get here? The equal protection principle that
"likes should be treated alike" has been integral to western culture for
thousands of years.3 Indeed, the notion of equality has biblical origins,4 as
in the New Testament, where the "golden rule"--do unto others as you
would have others do unto you-is set out. 5 Implicit in this rule is an
admonition that to treat others properly, justly, one must treat them equally.
Plato, the Greek philosopher, once noted that laws make people equal
even though they are unequal in wisdom and ability.6 Aristotle argued,
however, that like things should be treated alike, but unalike things should
be treated unalike in proportion to their inherent differences.7 Aristotle's
proposition, that justice or fairness can be measured by the proportional
equality of treatment given individuals, is today a dominant force in
Western thought.8 Several later philosophers, including Thomas Hobbes,
recognized a "natural right" to equality. In the eighteenth century,
Rousseau and Locke argued that "equality" was the original human state,
that humans were born equal, that it was "society" that broke the bond
between humans and that equality, and that human disputes, when they
occurred, were over how much inequality individuals should be willing to
tolerate.9

3.

Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
JAMES A. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1:2 (2003) (citing the
golden rule as the foundation of universal antagonism toward inequality); see also John
Marquez Lundin, The Law of Equality Before Equality Was Law, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1137, 1144 (1999) (noting multiple New Testament references to equality principles).
5.
Matthew 7:12 (King James) ("Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that
men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets."); see also
KUSHNER, supra note 4, at § 1:2.
6.
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, Book I, 338, 355 at 16, 37 (A. Bloom trans., 1968);
4.

see also KUSHNER, supra note 4, at § 1:2.

7.
Aristotle directly acknowledged the relationship between justice and equality
by stating that the two were synonymous: that which is just is equal, and that which is unjust

is unequal. ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA V.3.1131a- 1131b (W. Ross trans., 1925); see
also Westen, supra note 3, at 543.

8.
Westen, supra note 3, at 543. Roman Stoic philosophers advocated equality of
status and treatment, and decried discrimination on the basis of sex, class, or race, as
contrary to the laws of nature. KUSHNER, supra note 4, at § 1:2.
9.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, A Dissertation on the Origin and Foundation of the
Inequality of Mankind, in 38 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 333-66 (Robert

Maynard Hutchins ed., 1982); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, in CAMBRIDGE
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Interestingly, the common belief in the justice of equal treatment is
not based solely on religious, social and political philosophy. Human
behavioral studies have shown that, by nature, individuals simply do not
respond favorably to treatment that is dissimilar to that received by others
similarly situated.' 0 This is true regardless of whether the perceived
unequal treatment is superior or inferior. In a 2002 study regarding the
unequal treatment of siblings, for example, researchers found that
inequality negatively impacted both siblings." When siblings perceive that
they are being treated fairly, each child is less prone to problems such as12
depression and anxiety, and more likely to have higher self-esteem.
Researchers found that even the child who receives better treatment than a
sibling "may have
difficulties if they don't believe that the better treatment
13
was deserved."'
Human beings, therefore, intuitively reject unfairness. But is this
human tendency to reject inequality an evolved behavior, or solely a
learned behavior derived from cultural influences? There is some evidence
that it is genetic.' 4 A 2003 study by researchers working with Capuchin
monkeys suggests that evolution may play a role in the human attraction to
equality. In this study, pairs of these South American primates were placed
next to each other and trained to exchange a small rock with their human
handlers within sixty seconds. 5
When one monkey successfully
exchanged the rock within the time limit, she was rewarded with a piece of
cucumber.' 6 The other partner who made a swap received either the same
reward as their partner (a cucumber), or a better reward (a grape, a more
desirable food),
even though they had done less work or, in some cases, no
17
work at all.
TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

269-72 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988); see also

Ronald C. Griffin, Coming To Terms With Equality, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 431, 434 (1996).
10.
Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equality Passe? Homo Reciprocans and
the Future of Egalitarian Politics, BOSTON REV. (Oct./Nov. 1998), available at

http://bostonreview.net/BR23.6/bowles.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).

11.
Jim Barlow, Fairness of Sibling Treatment Key to Its Impact, Study Shows,
available at www.news.uiuc.edu/scitips/02/0924siblings.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Nicholas Wade, Genetic Basis to Fairness,Study Hints, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2003, at A27; see also Sean Markey, Monkeys Show Sense of Fairness, Study Says, at

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/09/09 17_030917-monkeyfaimess.html (last
visited Feb. 11, 2004).

15.
Sean Markey, Monkeys Show Sense of Fairness, Study Says, at
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/09/0917_030917-monkeyfairness.html (last
visited Feb. 11, 2004).

16.
17.

Id.
Id.
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The response to the unequal treatment was "astonishing."' 18 Those
primates who witnessed unfair treatment and failed to benefit from it often
refused to conduct future exchanges with the human researchers. 19 The
Capuchins even refused to eat the cucumbers they had earned, and in some
cases, hurled their cucumbers at the human researchers. 20 They desired not
merely a reward for their efforts, but a reward that was fair and
proportional relative to that being received by the other monkeys. The
results of the study led the researchers to conclude that human aversion to
unfairness was evolved and not simply a social construct, 21 that there is
some "evolutionary reason why we [humans] do not like being treated
unfairly."2 2
II.

PRE- FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION

The Fourteenth Amendment did not represent the birth of equal
protection law.23 In 1620, the Mayflower Compact contained an agreement
to enact "just and equal laws, 24 and the Declaration of Independence stated
that it is "self-evident" that "all men are created equal. 25 These same
principals were articulated in early state constitutions, many of which
contained "equality" or "impartiality" provisions. 266 The Massachusetts
Constitution, for example, provided that "all men are born free and
equal, 27 and the Oregon Constitution declared that "all men.., are equal
in rights. 28 Other state constitutions contained similar provisions that
entailed only slight variations on the "free and equal" theme.

18.
19.

20.

Id.
Id.

Sean

Markey,

Monkeys

Show

Sense

of

Fairness, Study

Says,

http://news.nationalgeographic.comnews/2O03/09/0917_O30917-monkeyfairness.htm
visited Feb. 11, 2004).
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.

at

(last

See generally, EARL M. MALTZ, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW

OF THE CONSTITUTION 9-28 (2003).
24.
MAYFLOWER COMPACT (1620), reprinted in 5 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 15 (1975).

25.

26.
27.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

Lundin, supra note 4, at 1156.
MASS. CONST. art. I(1780), reprinted in 5 SWINDLER, supra note 24, at 93; see

also Lundin, supra note 4, at 1145.
28.
OR. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1857), reprinted in 8 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 205 (1975); see also Lundin, supra
note 4, at 1145.
29.
See ILL. CONST. art. VIII (1818), reprintedin 3 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, SOURCES
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During this antebellum period, however, the concept of "judicial
review" was in its infancy. 30 State courts did not view state constitutional
provisions as enforceable but rather as "principles of government" that
were descriptive, or hortatory, as opposed to normative. 31 They were
considered more a declaration of political truths or aspirations than a limit
on state action,32 and hence there was hesitancy on the part of the judiciary
to require equal treatment as a guarantee that derived from the positive
law.33 Still, in at least some state courts, there were a significant number of
influential pre-Fourteenth Amendment equal protection decisions relating
to (1) "partial laws" (referred to in modern state constitutions as "special
legislation"), (2) business classifications, and (3) racial classifications.
Perhaps the most complete body of early "equal protection" law in
state courts dealt with "partial" or special laws.34 State courts repeatedly
invalidated laws that singled out a particular class or person as the recipient
of special rights or the carrier of extra burdens.3 5 For example, in the 1814
case of Holden v. James,36 the plaintiff sought to recover funds from the
administrator of an estate.3 7 Massachusetts law provided that such a suit
had to be commenced within four years from the time of the creation of the
estate," 38 but the state legislature passed an act that extended by one year
the statute of limitations with respect
to "the several actions, suits, and
claims" that Holden might bring. 39 Holden subsequently filed suit within

§ I
(1838), reprintedin 2 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS 317 (1975); IND. CONST. art. I, § I (1846), reprintedin 3 SWINDLER, supra
note 29, at 378; N.H. CONST. Part I, art. 1 (1784), reprinted in 6 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER,
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 344; OHIO CONST. art. VIII §
I (1802), reprinted in 7 SWINDLER, supra note 25, at 553; PA. CONST. art. I, reprinted in 8
SWINDLER, supra note 28, at 278; see also Lundin, supra note 4, at 1189 n.33.
30.
Robert F. Williams, Equality Guaranteesin State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 1195, 1205 (1985).
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
See Lundin, supra note 4, at 1140-41 (stating that like the language in the
Declaration of Independence, state constitutional equality guarantees were often hortatory
rather than prohibitory).
34.
Partial laws in this context refer to laws that apply exclusively to a particular
class or individual. Such laws may impose burdens or grant benefits.
35.
Lundin, supra note 4, at 1158-59.
36.
11 Mass. 396 (1814).
37.
Holden, 1I Mass. at 398.
38.
Id. at 399.
39.
Id. In essence, the special act provided that Holden could commence all claims
as he may have against the Ranger Estate in the same manner as if the suit had been brought
within the statute of limitations. The act provided, however, that the action must be brought
within one year of the passage of the act. Id.
AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 244 (1975); FLA. CONST. art. I,
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the year provided by the special act.4° After hearing arguments, however,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts invalidated the special act.4 1
The court did not expressly rely on the "free and equal clause" of the
Massachusetts Constitution, but stated that:
It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil
liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our
constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy
privileges and advantages which are denied to all others
under like circumstances, or that any one should be
subjected to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which
all others, under like circumstances, are exempted. a
Other state courts employed similar reasoning in striking down

"partial" laws,43 but several state courts did address "special legislation"

through state constitutional provisions. For example, in Tennessee and
Iowa courts interpreted their states' "law of the land" (due process)
provisions to require general laws binding on all members of the
community. 44
This different methodology, however, illustrates the
inconsistent manner in which state courts enforced equality during the
antebellum era; whether and on what basis they would invalidate unequal
laws was open to speculation.4 5
Prior to the Civil War state courts also had occasion to evaluate
statutory classifications distinguishing between businesses. In the 1854
case of Webb v. Baird, for example, an Indiana statute authorized courts to
require attorneys to defend indigent clients without compensation in civil
suits.46 The Indiana Supreme Court noted that the professional services of
attorneys are no more at the mercy of the public than "the goods of the
merchant, or the crops of the farmer, or the wares of the mechanic," 7 and
rejected the contention that attorneys have an "honorary duty . . . or

40.
41.

42.

Id.
Id. at 405.

Holden, II Mass. at 405.

43.
See Williams, supra note 30, at 1201; see also Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28
Wis. 464, 467 (1871); Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15, 1849 WL 156 at *9 (Iowa 1849)
(stating that "laws affecting life, liberty and property must be general in their application,
operating upon the entire community alike").
44.
Williams, supra note 30, at 1202; see also Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. 230,
239 (1829).
45.
See Lundin, supra note 4, at 1143.
46.
Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 1854 WL 3268 at *1 (1854).
47.
Id.

2004]

EQUALITY IN CULTURE AND LA W

reciprocal obligation . . . to the body politic" which was sufficient to

support being required to work for the government for free. a8 The
gratuitous defense law was held to "trespass unjustly upon the rights and
generous feelings of the bar, levying upon that class a discriminating and
unconstitutional tax.

' 49

Another case that dealt with differential treatment of businesses under
a state constitution was the 1868 case of Nashville v. Althrop.50 This case,
decided the same year the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, dealt with a
municipal law that imposed a different manner of taxation on merchants
who sold their products by sample as compared to merchants who sold
their products in a different manner.5' The Tennessee Supreme Court
acknowledged that municipalities had the power to impose a reasonable tax
on their merchants, but struck down the ordinance nonetheless, 52 stating
that the authority granted to municipalities cannot enable
them to
53
discriminate between persons exercising the same privilege.
Finally, in the early to mid-1800s, state courts also began to more
frequently scrutinize laws that classified citizens on the basis of race. A
significant landmark was the 1836 case of Commonwealth v. Aves, which
abolished slavery in Massachusetts.54 In Ayes, a Louisiana resident went to
visit her father in Massachusetts and brought "a colored female child,
named Med" with her. 55 She eventually became ill and left the girl in the
care of the father.56 When a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed
on the child's behalf,57 a judge granted the writ of habeas corpus, 58 and
the
59
case was argued before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw ruled that the "free and equal clause" of
the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution had effectively abolished slavery
because "it is contrary to natural right and the plain principals of justice."6
He wrote that the state constitution was "plain and explicit" in providing
that "all men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential,

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Mayor of Nashville v. Althrop, 45 Tenn. 554, 1868 WL 2153, at *I (1868).
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. 193 (1836).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 195.
Ayes, 35 Mass. at 210.
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and unalienable rights.' Justice Shaw reasoned that "it would be difficult
to select words more precisely adapted to the abolition of Negro slavery. 62
However, there was a different outcome thirteen years later, in 1849,
when the issue of school segregation came before the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Roberts v. City of Boston.63 In Roberts, the city of
Boston had established two primary schools "for the exclusive use of
colored children. '64 The teachers at these schools possessed the same
qualifications and received the same compensation as the teachers in other
like schools in the city.65 When Sarah Roberts applied for admission to the
school nearest her home, she was denied entrance based on her skin color.66
Sarah challenged the city's school assignment policy under the free and
equal clause of the Massachusetts Constitution.6 7
The case was argued before the Massachusetts Supreme Court, and in
an opinion that appeared to be inconsistent with the reasoning employed in
Aves, the court upheld the segregation plan.68 In declining to give teeth to
the "free and equal" provision under these circumstances, Justice Shaw
now argued that deference to the legislature was appropriate: "[t]he proper
province of a declaration of rights and constitution . . . is to influence and
direct the conscience of legislators in making laws, rather than to limit and
control them." 69 Anticipating Plessy v. Ferguson by almost 50 years,
Justice Shaw rejected the contention that the maintenance of separate
schools would tend to deepen and perpetuate prejudice, stating that
prejudice is "not created by law, and probably cannot be changed by
law.070 This was the uncertain state of "equal protection" law as the nation
moved toward the Civil War.

III. THE CIVIL WAR AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Fourteenth Amendment was necessary because even though the
Thirteenth Amendment, ratified in 1865, gave constitutional sanction to the

61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
59 Mass. 198 (1849).
64.
Roberts, 59 Mass. at 199.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Id. See also Williams, supra note 30, at 1204.
68.
Roberts, 59 Mass. at 210.
69.
Id. at 206-07.
70.
Id. See also Williams, supra note 30, at 1205 (stating that "unhappily, [the
Roberts case] supplied the separate but equal doctrine which lasted another century").
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"emancipation proclamation" of 1863, separate "black codes" in the
Southern states still existed by 1866. 71 Consequently, the post-Civil War
radical Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to prohibit unequal
treatment in state civil legal matters.72 President Andrew Johnson vetoed
the Act, however, because in his view the law had no basis in any of the
constitutionally granted powers,73 so Congress began working on the
Fourteenth Amendment to retroactively ratify the 1866 Act. But the
Fourteenth Amendment, ultimately ratified in 1868, ended up using far
more sweeping general terms than the acts it was designed to sustain.74 In
other words, it was not based on race as the 1866 Civil Rights Act had
been, but was much broader in potential scope.75
The most common theory used to explain this change is that, in order
to assure passage, the so-called "radical republicans" in Congress, who
supported business and corporate interests, had to be appeased by the antislavery forces.76 Emerging national entrepreneurs wanted protection from
state regulation intended to protect local interests from corporate abuses
and indifference. The Fourteenth Amendment's language, therefore, was
reluctantly broadened by anti-slavery forces to at least potentially protect
corporations and other "persons" in order to guarantee passage.77 Thus, the
Fourteenth Amendment, which may have been initiated largely to eliminate
the continued subjugation of the former slaves, actually served to
nationalize the protection of individual rights for everyone, allowing for

71.
New laws were being enacted that limited the rights of former slaves to such an
extent that their newfound freedom was of little value. See generally KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

864 (14th

Ed. West 2001)

[hereinafter SULLIVAN & GUNTHER].
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV with 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2003) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (2003).
75.
The principle aim of the Fourteenth Amendment was to incorporate into the
federal constitution the fundamental rights that individuals already possessed under a
general theory but that states had failed to adequately enforce, rather than to create new
rights. Lundin, supra note 4, at 1143.
76.
It was clear that the amendment would not easily be passed.
The
Reconstruction Congress contained a number of representatives from southern states who
were determined to reject the Fourteenth Amendment. Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third
Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of
Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1217 (1999). The amendment's passage was
only obtained when the leading congressional republicans circumvented the technical rules
for constitutional amendments, impeached the president and threatened ongoing military
occupation of the South. Id.
77.
See generally Howard Jay Graham, "The Conspiracy Theory" of the
FourteenthAmendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938).
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uniform national standards of fairness and equality applicable
everywhere.78
The Fourteenth Amendment, it is worth noting, did not articulate a
new right but rather a new means of protecting rights that had not been
consistently enforced under many state constitutions. 79 The Amendment
provides that "no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. 8 ° Such simple sounding language has proven
difficult to interpret. Indeed, equal protection jurisprudence has been
described as incoherent, "rudderless," unprincipled and ultimately
astonishing.8' It is by now clear, however, that any statutory classification
scheme must be reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation, and
that those who are similarly situated must be similarly treated.83
The ultimate scope and force of the equal protection clause was not
apparent from the start. In the Slaughterhouse Cases,84 in 1873, a
Louisiana law chartered a corporation granting a few butcher-shareholders
a twenty five-year monopoly over butchering in three counties, including
New Orleans, and destroying the rights of the remaining butchers to
maintain their trade. Plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that this was not equal
protection of the laws.8 5 The Court found, however, that this zoning

78.
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 71, at 411 (stating that the post-civil war
amendments were a sign of growing national concern with protection of individual rights
from state action).
79.
Lundin, supra note 4, at 1146.
80.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
81.
Lundin, supra note 4, at 1146.
82.
This is a variation of the rationality requirement imposed in the examination of
due process claims. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 71, at 601.
83.
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949) [hereinafter Tussman]; Melanie E. Meyers, Note,
Impermissible Purposes and the Equal Protection Clause, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1184 (1986).
See also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 470 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the principle of the Fourteenth
Amendment is that there is a "constitutional judgment that [any] two individuals or groups
are entitled to be treated equally with respect to something"). By the same token, those who
are not similarly situated need not be similarly treated. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (rejecting an attack on the California statutory rape law which
punished the male, but not the female, participant in intercourse when the female was under
eighteen and not the male's wife, even if the male was also under eighteen because the law
realistically reflected the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated because only women
become pregnant); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (rejecting a challenge to a
law authorizing registration of males for a potential military draft but not females because
women may not legally serve in combat, and thus are not similarly situated to men for
purposes of registration for the draft).
84.
83 U.S. 36 (1873).
85.
Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 36.
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regulation was one of the "most necessary and frequent exercises of the
[police] power" and a rational means of accomplishing proper ends,
improving public health and welfare.86 Besides, Justice Miller noted, it was
"clear" that the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was to rectify slavery,
a matter of "personal servitude," not property or "economic servitude. 87
Justice Miller went on to state:
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share
in this protection .... But what we do say ... is, that in
any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of
these amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose
which we have said was the pervading spirit of them all,
the evil which they were designed to remedy, and the
process of continued addition to the Constitution, until that
purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as
constitutional law can accomplish it....
We doubt very much whether any action of a State
not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes
as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
88
come within the purview of this provision.
These pronouncements, though eventually quite wrong, began a
period of extreme reluctance to refer to or enforce the Equal Protection
Clause, a period that would last over sixty years. 89 This was the case even
though Justice Field, in his Slaughterhouse dissent, set the stage for what
would become the premise of modem equal protection doctrine by writing:
[There is an] equality of right . . . throughout the whole
country, [which] is the distinguishing privilege of citizens
of the United States. ... [G]rants of exclusive privileges..

86.
Id.at 63.
87.
See id. at 68.
88.
Id.at 72, 81.
89.
The Supreme Court set the groundwork for "substantive due process" as a basis
for striking state laws in the 1870s and 1880s. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1876); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). It may be no coincidence, therefore, that
the rare use of equal protection doctrine to strike a law between the 1880s and the 1940s
occurred the same year as Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), where "substantive"
due process was first used to strike a state law. See Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165
U.S. 150 (1897) (overturning a law under which only railroads had to pay attorneys" fees in
certain cases).
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* [are] opposed to the whole theory of free government,
and it requires no aid from any bill of rights to render them
void. That only is a free government, in the American
sense of the term, under which the inalienable right of
every citizen to pursue his happiness is unrestrained,
except by just, equal and impartial laws. 90

IV. THE POST-CIVIL WAR ERA

The first significant striking of a state law under the equal protection
clause came seven years after Slaughterhouse, in Strauder v. West
Virginia,91 where a black man appealed his conviction for murder by a jury
from which blacks were excluded by law. 92 The Court said:
[The words of the Fourteenth Amendment] contain a
necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right,....
to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them
[because of race], . . . exemption from legal
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of rights that
others enjoy,93...
and reducing them to the condition of a
subject race.
The Strauder decision, reasoning as did Slaughterhouse from the
historical "anti-slavery" purpose of the Amendment, implied and enforced
a "presumption" that race-based legislation is purposeless, invidious and
repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause. This decision, of course, was not
an example of the "strict scrutiny" seen in equal protection decisions after
the 1940s. Nevertheless, it was an important recognition that, given the
Fourteenth Amendment, some more demanding form of judicial scrutiny
was required for race-based legislation.
The broader reading of the Fourteenth Amendment urged by the
dissenters in the Slaughterhouse Cases-and to some extent conceded by
the majority94-was ultimately applied by the Court just a few years later in

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 109-11 (1873).
100 U.S. 303 (1879).
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304.
Id. at 307-08.
Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 72 ("We do not say that no one else but the negro
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Yick Wo v. Hopkins.95 In Yick Wo, the challenged law, while not
discriminatory on its face, in applicationdenied permits to run laundries to
ethnic Chinese.9 6 The Court held for the Chinese laundrymen and
expanded the scope of equal protection analysis in a number of ways.97
Equal protection now applied to aliens, as well as citizens of all races, and
the holding broadened the scope of protection from political rights, such as
voting and jury service, to economic rights.98 However, ten years after Yick
Wo, the Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson99 made it clear that while
political and economic rights would now be equally protected, this would
not be the case with so-called "social" rights.1°° As a result of Plessy,
separation of the races would be acceptable in daily life for at least another
sixty years. 01'
V.

THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

After Yick Wo, and immediately after Plessy, as the Court began to
move into the "progressive era" (1890 to 1925), three observations would
have seemed reasonable. First, while equal protection doctrine might be
available to remedy inequitable treatment on the basis of race, separate but
equal treatment of the races would be sufficient. Second, with one rare
exception, 0 2 the evolving federal equal protection doctrine seemed unlikely
to address disparate treatment of economic liberties. Third, if economic
liberties were to be protected, it would be under principles of "substantive
due process," a doctrine with a long, historic tradition
of protecting rights
03
deemed "fundamental" as a matter of natural law. 1

can share in this protection").
95.
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
96.
See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 366-68.
97.
Id. at 374.
98.
Lundin, supra note 4, at 1201-05.
99.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
100.
In Plessy, the Court sustained a Louisiana law requiring "equal but separate"
accommodations for "white" and "colored" railroad passengers. The Court argued that
while the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to enforce equality, it could not be intended
to abolish all distinctions based on color or to enforce social as compared to political
equality. 163 U.S. at 551.
101.
Until Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
102.
Gulf Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). The only other
significant use of equal protection to strike an economic law during the progressive era
occurred in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
103.
The tradition began, in the United States, as early as Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386
(1798). After Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), substantive due process soon
became the preferable justification for striking anti-business legislation.
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This later trend of using substantive due process arose even though
lack of equal treatment under law might have made more sense as a
justification for several important decisions during that era. In the famous
pivotal case of Lochner v. New York,1°4 for example, a state labor law
prohibiting the employment of bakery employees for more than ten hours
per day or sixty hours per week was challenged as an irrational interference
with contractual rights. 0 5 The Court, supported by what was now a
generation of emerging "economic due process" dicta, held that the statute
unreasonably deprived the plaintiffs employees of their liberty to contract
without due process.1°6
In Lochner, however, the Court was faced with a state "health and
safety regulation" of only one, obviously politically ineffective, small
portion of the entire food industry, bakeries, raising what today would be
an "under-inclusiveness" equal protection argument. 0 7 Yet the Court
chose not to hold that bakery owners' equal protection rights were violated
in that they were treated differently than, say, butchers, who were0 8 in an
even more dangerous occupation but were nevertheless unregulated.
During the 1920s and early 1930s, the Court continued to strike
statutes that restricted businesses, as in Lochner, because the state's
purpose was simply unwise,1°9 even though the use of an equal protection
justification might have been more rational, deferential to legislatures, and
politically acceptable." 0 But toward the end of the era, by the time of
Weaver v. Palmer Bros.,"' in 1926, subtle changes were afoot. Weaver
involved a challenge to a law prohibiting the use of cut up rags ("shoddy")
in the manufacture of bedding." 2 The Court ostensibly struck the law as
unfair and unreasonable, based on the substantive due process of
Lochner," 3 but the Court 4 also suggested that the law was really
unjustifiable discrimination."1

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 46.
Id. at 53.
See Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-12 (Jackson, J.,
(1949).
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 46.
See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
See Ry. Express, 336 U.S. at I I 1-12 (Jackson, J., concurring).
270 U.S. 402 (1926).
Weaver, 270 U.S. at 409.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 414-15. The law allowed the use of other stuffing materials if they were
114.
sterilized and labeled, but not the rags, even if they were sterilized and labeled. id.

104.
105.
106.
107.
concurring)
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
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Decisions like Weaver were consistent with the few, rare economic
equal protection decisions that had also emerged during the progressive era.
In 1911, for example, in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 15 a
challenge was made to a New York statute that prohibited the drawing and
collecting of carbonic acid gas by pumps or other artificial appliances from
any well. The fear was that this practice tended to interfere with the rights
of others to make such draws on the water.1 6 The challengers, however,
claimed that this inherent classification, "artificial appliances" as compared
to natural means, was arbitrary and a denial of equal protection."17 The
Lindsley court failed to strike the law, holding that if there were any set of
facts that could reasonably be conceived that would sustain the law, the
existence of
those facts is presumed to have been present when the law was
8
enacted. "1
This newly articulated "rational basis" standard of review was used
with a much different result toward the end of the progressive era. Nine
years after Lindsley, in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,"19 a state law
taxed the income of local corporations from business done outside and
inside the state, but exempted entirely the out-of-state income of local
corporations which did no local business. Here, the law was found to be a
20
matter of arbitrary discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause.
In striking the law, the court articulated a modified, more demanding
version of the "rational basis" standard of review. The Royster Guano
standard required that: "the classification [system, not just the law itself,]
must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
2
alike." ' '
The subtle distinction between the rules in Lindsley and Royster
Guano became the subject of debate on the Court by 1949 in Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 122 where a law which prohibited advertising
on vehicles for pay, but which nevertheless allowed business owners to
advertise on their own delivery trucks, was found not to violate equal

115.
220 U.S. 61 (1911).
116.
Id.at 73.
117.
Id.at 79.
118.
Id. at 78 (following the deference to the legislature called for by the means ends
principle of M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)).
119.
253 U.S. 412 (1920).
120.
Id.at 417.
121.
Id. at 415.
122.
336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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protection.123 Justice Douglas, for the majority, 24 and Justice Jackson in his
concurrence, 25 agreed on the result but argued for the differing standards
of review articulated in Lindsley and Royster Guano, respectively. Justice
Douglas acknowledged that classifications in laws must be treated with
deference unless the purposes of the law are illusory. 26 If the classification
has a relation to a legitimate purpose, even hypothetical considerations will
allow the law to stand. 27 Justice Jackson, in concurrence, however,
suggested that Royster Guano, with its requirement that there must be a
rational basis not just for the law but also for the distinctions in the law,
the better standard of review. 28 This debate continues to this
provided
9
day.

12

VI. THE EARLY MODERN ERA
By the beginning of the "modem era" (between 1937 and 1944), three
important decisions would drastically shift the course of equal protection
doctrine and create the basis for the contemporary analytical framework.
The first of these, Carolene Products,30 a seemingly innocuous "economic

Ry. Express, 336 U.S. at 109.
123.
124. Id.
125. Id.at Ill.
126. Id.at 110.
127. Ry. Express, 336 U.S. at 110.
128. Id.at 115.
129. Between 1949 and the early 1970s, the Supreme Court mostly maintained
traditional deference toward economic and social legislation as against equal protection
challenges. For subsequent exercises of Lindsley deferential review after Railway Express,
see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (sustaining an Oklahoma law,
the effect of which was to make illegal the fitting or duplicating of lenses by opticians
without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist because even though this may
be a "needless, wasteful requirement in many cases ...it is for the legislature, not the
courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement .... [It] is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."). See also New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (sustaining a 1972 New Orleans ordinance which exempted
pushcart food vendors who had "continually operated the same businesses for at least eight
years" from a prohibition against such vendors in the French Quarter); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (sustaining a state statute requiring all state police officers to
retire at age fifty). Beginning in the 1980s, however, we saw the re-emergence of the
standard of review debate over economic and social laws begun in Railway Express. See,
e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). By 1985, showing far less deference,
the Court actually struck an economic regulation. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470
U.S. 869 (1985) (rejecting a tax preference for local insurance companies).
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
130.
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due process" opinion, would ultimately (and radically) re-structure equal
protection doctrine. In that case, the Court simply sustained a law
3
regulating "filled" milk as against a substantive due process challenge.' 1
This was nothing new, as such challenges had already lost their viability
four years earlier in Nebbia v. New York. 32 Nevertheless, Carolene
Products produced one of the most important footnotes in Supreme Court
history. It suggested the future possibility of "heightened" judicial scrutiny,
a sort of "two-tiered" standard of review, under the Equal Protection
Clause:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
constitution [or is directed at religious, national, or racial
minorities.] . . . [P]rejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied on to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry. '33
Only four years later, the influence of "footnote 4" revitalized equal
protection doctrine in the modem era as both a means of protecting
fundamental rights that were significantly impacted and classes of persons
subject to "suspect" disparate treatment. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,134 the
second of the pivotal decisions of this era, a state law required the
sterilization of those convicted a third time for a crime involving "moral
turpitude." However, the statutory definition of "moral turpitude" included
grand larceny, but not embezzlement.' 35 Justice Douglas, for the majority,
held that the statute amounted to invidious discrimination with regard to
marriage and procreation, which he deemed "one of the basic civil rights
of man." Justice Douglas stated that in such circumstances, "strict scrutiny
of the classification .. is essential.' 3 6
In articulating a new fundamental right, and invoking a new, higher
standard of review, though, Justice Douglas sought to avoid justifying his

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 151.
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
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decision under the rubric of substantive due process, an approach out of
favor after 1938 as improper "second-guessing" of legislatures. Many
statutes, however, can be viewed as either unreasonable laws or
unreasonably discriminatorylaws. 137 In choosing the later view of the law,
Justice Douglas was able to frame the question in equal protection terms
instead of relying on substantive due process. Rather than "second
guessing" the legislature, Justice Douglas tacitly acknowledged the
legislative purpose but saw the case as invidious legislative antipathy
toward those who were generally poor thieves, as compared to those who
tended to be wealthier embezzlers.138 This choice made "political" sense,
as would be made clear seven years later in Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 139 because under-inclusive laws are often evidence of corruption
or invidious motives to40 which courts should be far more sensitive than laws
enforced too broadly.
The Court in Skinner, therefore, borrowed from discredited
"substantive due process" the practice of articulating without clear textual
basis a "fundamental right to procreate."' 4' The Court also leaned on the
"substantive due process" case, Carolene Products, to justify the
appropriateness of "higher scrutiny," but strictly scrutinized and protected
that right as a matter of equal protection. 42 This new "fundamental rights"
strand of equal protection would ultimately expand, especially during the

137.
See for example, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), where it was argued
by different Justices that either theory would justify the result. In Zablocki, a Wisconsin law
provided that any resident "having minor issue" not in his custody which he is under an
obligation to support by any court order could not marry without court approval. 434 U.S.
at 375. The majority decided the case as a matter of equal protection based on substantive
due process precedent on the question of the existence of a "fundamental right." Id. at 382.
138.
See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540.
139.
336 U.S. 106 (1949).
140.
Justice Jackson stated that "invalidation ... on due process grounds leaves
ungoverned and ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable." Id. at 112.
Justice Jackson contrasted this with the use of the Equal Protection Clause, which he said
"does not disable [the government] from dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means
that the prohibition or regulation must have a broader (or narrower) impact." Id.
141.
The cases serving as precedent for this right, after all, were two Lochner-era
cases: Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510(1925).
142.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (pointing to a substantive
due process right to sexual privacy but extending it to single people as a matter of equal
protection). See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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1960s, 45to include rights of personal mobility,

courts.

1

43

voting,' 44 and access to

The third case of great significance in the early modern era was
Korematsu v. United States, 146 in 1944. There, a military order during
the Second World War that excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry
from designated areas on the west coast was sustained. 147 Justice Black,
however, broke new ground by declaring that notwithstanding the
narrow holding of the case, "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect" and "courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial
148
antagonism never can."'
Still, this was not "strict scrutiny" as we have known since the midsixties. 149 While the need to defer to the military in wartime was obviously
a "compelling state interest," satisfying one demand of modem "strict
scrutiny," the majority neither required nor applied the other modem
requirement, a "least restrictive means" test. 50 Nevertheless, racial
distinctions were now expressly required to meet a much higher level of
scrutiny 151 even though the decision announcing this principle was one of
the few rare cases in which a classification based on race or ancestry has

143.
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
144.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
145.
See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
146.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
147.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
148.
Id. (emphasis added).
149.
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (articulating the
modern strict scrutiny standard for substantive due process); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I
(1967) (setting forth strict scrutiny standard for equal protection).
150.
Such a requirement was suggested, by implication, in Justice Murphy's dissent.
Justice Murphy wrote that the deprivation of Japanese-American's rights was not
"reasonably related to [avoiding] a public danger that is so imminent ... as not to admit of
delay [or] to permit the intervention of ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the
danger." Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234. In Korematsu, however, although the fundamental
ights of the plaintiff were clearly infringed, the Court used relatively deferential review,
allowing this law to stand because of the special circumstances created by the war with
Japan. See Michael W. Dowdle, Note, The Descent of Antidiscrimination: On the
Intellectual Origins of the Current Equal Protection Jurisprudence,66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1165, 1224-25 (1991).
This was clearly not the case for gender-based distinctions during this era. See,
151.
e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (finding Illinois could deny bar admission on
the basis of gender); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
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survived "strict scrutiny." ' 152
However, though Korematsu provided
somewhat more demanding scrutiny than had already been seen in Strauder
and Yick Wo, it remained to be seen what impact this newly articulated
requirement of "strict" scrutiny might have on the long-standing Plessy
notion that "separate but equal" treatment of the races was acceptable.
This question was answered ten years later, in Brown v. Board of
Education,153 where black children sought admission to public schools in
their community on a non-segregated basis. 154 They had been denied this
due to laws requiring segregation by race.155 After nearly sixty years, the
Court finally revisited Plessy v. Fergusonand faced directly the question of
whether similarly situated but segregated public schools really amounted to
equal protection. The schools for blacks and whites in Topeka, Kansas,
were found to be equal. 56 But, the Court said its decision "[could] not turn
on merely a comparison of tangible factors in the Negro and white schools
involved."'' 57 A unanimous Court found that:
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments ....
It is the very foundation of
good citizenship.... [I]t is doubtful [today] that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is
a right which must be made available to all on equal
58
terms.1
This was because non-tangibles, like the value of social and
intellectual interaction, are very important in education, and because
separating young children solely because of race:
[G]enerates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.... The impact is greater when

152.
See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)
(pointing out that strict scrutiny has usually been "strict in theory, but fatal in fact").
153.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
154.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 488.
155.
Id. at 486.
156.
Id. at 486 n.1.
157.
ld. at 492.
158.
Id. at 493.
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it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating
the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to (retard) the
educational and mental development of Negro children and
to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive
in a racial(ly) integrated school system.' 59
The problem, of course, would be the difficulty in implementing a
remedy for those subjected to generations of "separate but equal"
education. Brown 11,160 decided the following year, required the integration
of public schools with "all deliberate speed,"' 61 but it would take many
more years-and much litigation 6-to develop some contours for
to establish the legitimacy
remedying public school racial segregation, 1and
63
of affirmative action as a means of doing SO.
VIi. THE 1960s

By the 1960s there was a two-tiered approach to equal protection
analysis. Under this "new" or modern equal protection, where a "suspect
class" or "fundamental right" is implicated in a statutory classification, the
government has the burden of proving a close congruence between the
scope of the regulation and its aim or purpose. That is, the law must serve
a compelling state interest or purpose and be narrowly tailored to meet that
interest.164 All other legislative classification schemes not directed at such
classes or rights would receive the traditional, deferential rational basis test.

159.
Id. at 494.
160.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
161.
Id.at 301.
162.
This struggle included resolving, step-by-step over the years, problems created
by the difference between de jure and de facto discrimination. See, e.g., Green v. County
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I
(1971); Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974);
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33
(1990). A more recent example of federal litigation over the issues in Jenkins is discussed
in this symposium issue. P. Michael Mahoney & Scott Paccagnini, Declare Victory and Go
Home: The Practical Ramifications of the Seventh Circuit's Interpretation of Missouri v.
Jenkins in School DesegregationCases, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 683 (2004).

163.
(2003).
164.

These efforts culminated quite recently in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (Powell, J.,
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One problem, however, was that even though the "suspect class"
strand of equal protection doctrine continued to cause intensified scrutiny
of only racial, ethnic and nationality classes, the "fundamental interests"
strand threatened to approach Lochner-erasubstantive due process. 65 This
later strand seemed to potentially include a wide variety of interests:
welfare benefits,166 freedom from exclusionary zoning in housing
opportunities,167 and equitable school financing,168 among other things.
Nevertheless, today the only interests actually protected under the
"fundamental interests" strand continue to be primarily voting, 69 access to
courts, 170 interstate mobility,' 71 and liberties articulated in the Bill of
Rights.171
Another problem was that "new equal protection" was not so much a
form of analysis as it was mere categorization. 173 If the Court categorized
the case as appropriate for strict scrutiny, the government almost always
lost; 17if4 the traditional test was to be used, the government almost never
lost.

VIII. POST- 1970: THE POST-MODERN ERA

Discontent with the "two-tier approach" grew in the courts in the early
1970s. 175 Certain new classification schemes were given an "intermediate"

concurring) (stating that a race-based law is "constitutionally prohibited unless it is a
necessary means of advancing a compelling governmental interest"). See also, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
165.
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 71, at 603.
166.
See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56(1972).
167.
City of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
168.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973).
169.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
170.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
171.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975).
172.
Wealth classifications, however, would not be subject to strict scrutiny. James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
173.
See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 152, and accompanying text. Professor Gunther
urged the Court to engage in rationality review with "bite" or intensified review of means
even in economic or social laws, a demand for evidence of the rational relationship between
means and ends and no hypothesizing as to either rationality or the state goal. Id.
174.
But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238 (1995) (denying
that, at least in the area of affirmative action, the assertion that strict scrutiny is "strict in
theory but fatal in fact" is true).
175.
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 71, at 603-04.
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level of scrutiny, e.g., those based on gender, 76 alienage,177 and
illegitimacy. 78 These cases receive a heightened scrutiny that is somewhat
less demanding than strict scrutiny.179 Moreover, and perhaps more
importantly, the Supreme Court will now intervene under equal protection
even without using "strict scrutiny" 80language in situations where strict
scrutiny had not previously been used.
There has also been an effort by some members of the Court to find
new standards that would narrow the gap between the "tiers" by creating a
"sliding scale" of scrutiny,' 8' or one standard formula for equal protection
analysis. These efforts, though not yet explicitly acknowledged by a
majority of the Court, became evident in an increasing number of decisions
in the 1970s which spoke of minimum scrutiny but actually engaged in a
more demanding rational basis review
and found
statutes
unconstitutional. 82 This more exacting scrutiny was seen, early on, in

176. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
177. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny
to strike law denying welfare benefits to aliens). But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1973) (finding "political or governmental function" exception can allow mere
deferential review of discrimination against aliens).
178. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (calling for the "intermediate" standard
of review); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
179. Statutory classifications based on gender, alienage, or illegitimacy must serve
important (though not compelling) government objectives and be substantially related (not
most narrowly tailored) to accomplishing those objectives. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976).
180. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996) (striking a state constitutional
amendment "[that] withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection
from the injuries caused by discrimination, and . . . forbids reinstatement of these laws and
policies"); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). See generally Julie A.
Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the Coconstitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209 (1999).
181.
See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 321 (1976) (J.
Marshall dissenting) (outlining the dangers of the two-tiered approach and stating that
"[t]here is simply no reason why a statute that [forces police officers to retire at age fifty]
should be judged by the same minimal standards of rationality that we use to test economic
legislation that discriminates against business interests"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,dissenting) ("[Tihe level of scrutiny
employed in an equal protection case should vary with "the constitutional and societal
importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis
upon which the particular classification is drawn""). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969).
182. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. ...
[W]hat has become known as the two-tiered analysis of equal
protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of
deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain
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challenges to distinctions in entitlement programs, 83 and more recently,
with regard to certain classes of persons not previously 85afforded strict
84
1
scrutiny, such as homosexuals' and the mentally retarded.
In the mid-1970s, three additional classifications evoked some degree
of heightened or "intermediate" scrutiny-gender, alienage, 186 and
illegitimacy. 187 To some extent, the application of heightened scrutiny to
these classes was justified by way of analogy to existing "suspect"
classes,188 in other instances it followed from the trend toward more
demanding rational basis review. For example, these intertwining doctrinal
developments, which lead to the notion of "intermediate" scrutiny, are
perhaps best illustrated in the area of gender-based discrimination. In Reed
v. Reed, 89 in 1971, the Court overturned an Idaho statutory preference for
men over women who were competing to administer estates. However,

decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent
fashion.
Id. at 211-12. See also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[O]ur
cases reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications which have
been explained in opinions by terms ranging from "strict scrutiny" at one extreme to
"rational basis" at the other. I have never been persuaded that these so-called "standards"
adequately explain the decisional process").
See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (purporting to
183.
apply traditional rationality review in striking down a "food-stamp" law providing
assistance only to "households" defined as "related persons," and even though this arguably
would be rational "one-step-at-a-time" legislation, because a "related persons" distinction
for purpose of including hungry people in this program was irrational); Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (striking a federal welfare program which denied
disability benefits to some but not all illegitimates born after the onset of the parent/wage"earner's disability). See also James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
184.
185.
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Arguably, this sort of
judicial review may yet be extended to the mentally ill. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,
231 n.13 (1981) (Blackmun, J.) ("We ... intimate no view as to what standard of review
applies to legislation expressly classifying the mentally ill as a discrete group").
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (using strict scrutiny to strike laws
186.
denying welfare benefits to aliens). But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)
(stating "political or government function" exception can allow for mere rationality review
in some circumstances).
187.
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (articulating intermediate standard of
review in this area). See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968).
As Justice Powell said in San Antonio Independent School District v.
188.
Rodriguez, "[T]he traditional indicia of suspectness" are that the "class is ...saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." 411 U.S. 1,28 (1973).
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
189.
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using what appeared to be traditional "rational basis" review rather
analogizing from "suspectness" cases, the Court ruled that: "[a] mandatory
preference of one gender over another merely to avoid hearings on the
question is "the very kind190of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause.'
Just two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson,'9' the Court sustained
an equal protection challenge to a federal law permitting male soldiers an
automatic dependency allowance for their wives but requiring
servicewomen to prove by affidavit that their husbands were dependent
before receiving an allowance. In Frontiero, however, a plurality of the
Court made a fairly elaborate argument for gender as a "suspect"
classification scheme. Justice Brennan found implicit support for this in
Reed's departure from 'traditional' rational basis analysis, and argued that
"what [aligns sex] with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute
to society."'' 92 Nevertheless, in a concurring opinion, which created the
majority, Justices Powell and Blackmun decided on the basis of Reed and
argued that "suspectness" need not be found. 93
By 1976 in Craig v. Boren,194 the Court compromised and formally
adopted an "intermediate" rather than "strict" standard of review for
gender-based discrimination. 95 In Craig, an Oklahoma law prohibited the
sale of "non-intoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males between eighteen and
twenty-one but not to similarly-aged females. 196 The ostensible and
otherwise legitimate purpose was to reduce traffic fatalities among young
men, who had a statistically significant greater number of traffic violations
as a class than a similarly aged class of women.1 97 Justice Brennan, this
time writing for the Court, overturned the law. He held that classifications
by gender must serve "important" governmental objectives 98and must be
"substantially related" to the achievement of those objectives.1

190.
Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
191.
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
192.
Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686.
193.
Id.at 692.
194.
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
195.
This case marked the emergence of a consensus that intermediate (heightened)
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for gender classifications. It also made it clear
that even if gender-based discrimination is directed against males, rather than females, the
same scrutiny will apply. Craig,429 U.S. at 199.
196.
Id. at 192.
197.
Id. at 200.
198.
Id. at 197.
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Justice Brennan wrote: "Increasingly outdated misconceptions
concerning the role of females in the home rather than in the marketplace
and world of ideas [are no] more than loose-fitting characterizations
incapable of supporting statutory schemes premised on their accuracy. ' ' 99
Soon thereafter, it became clear that for gender discrimination to be found
and for such schemes to receive "intermediate" scrutiny, the discrimination
must be based on gender, not some other legitimate basis.2°
By the 1980s, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,20 1 the
Court not only affirmed that a majority of the Court continued to adhere to
"intermediate scrutiny" for sex discrimination, but clarified both the nature
of intermediate scrutiny, and the extent to which affirmative action will
satisfy such scrutiny. In Hogan, a young man who lived in a university
town applied to its nursing school but was denied admission on the basis of
gender as a matter of state law.2 °2 He was allowed to audit courses,
however, with the understanding that he would obtain his degree
elsewhere.20 3 These policies were justified as affirmative action intended to
provide educational opportunities in compensation for prior sex
discrimination against women.204
The Court held that intermediate scrutiny continues to be the standard
of review, even if males and not females are disadvantaged, 20 5 and that "the
validity of a classification must be determined through reasoned analysis"
rather than through "the mechanical application of traditional, often

199.
Id. at 198.
200.
Compare Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (invalidating a New York
law granting mothers of illegitimates the right to block adoptions by simply withholding
consent while fathers had to prove that it was contrary to the "best interests of the child"
because the state did not offer an important justification other than gender for distinguishing
between fathers and mothers in the burdens imposed upon them) with Parham v. Hughes,
441 U.S. 347 (1979) (rejecting an attack on a Georgia law which denied a father, but not a
mother, the right to sue for the wrongful death of an illegitimate unless he had legitimated
the child since mothers and fathers of illegitimates are not similarly situated: only fathers
can unilaterally legitimate children).
If the Court is not faced with true gender
discrimination, a deferential rational basis review may be used and the state will be
permitted to take only "one step at a time" toward its goal. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484, 492 (1974) (excluding "disability that accompanies normal pregnancy and childbirth"
from California's health insurance system was not invidious discrimination because the
scheme was not based on gender and classes may be dissimilarly treated if not for reasons of
gender).
201.
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720.
202.
203.
Id. at 720-21.
204.
Id.
205.
Id. at 723.
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inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women. ,,206
Finally, the state can establish an asserted benign or compensatory purpose
"only if members of the gender benefited by the classification scheme
actually suffer a disadvantage

related to the classification.,

20 7

Most

recently, in United States v. Virginia, °8 the Court reaffirmed these views.
There, the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), the sole single-sex school
among Virginia's public institutions of higher learning, used an
"adversative method" of training not available elsewhere for women to
instill physical, moral and mental discipline in its male cadets. 20 9 In
response to this suit, VMI proposed a parallel program for women located
at a private liberal arts school for women.21 ° Striking this disparate
treatment, the Court held, in a somewhat more elaborate formulation than
Hogan, that:
Parties who seek to defend gender-based government
action must demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive

justification" for that action ....

The justification must be

genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response
to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females....
[Inherent differences between men and women] may

not be used, as they once were ...

to create or perpetuate

the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.2"

As for those cases in which "rational basis" review was the articulated
standard, but the analysis was more akin to strict scrutiny, Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center212 and Romer v. Evans 213 are most noteworthy. In
Cleburne, a city denied a special use permit for the operation of a group
home for the mentally retarded under an ordinance requiring permits for

206.
207.

Id. at 726.
Id. at 728.

209.
210.

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520.
Id. at 526.

208.
211.
212.
213.

518 U.S. 515 (1996).

Id. at 531-34 (internal citations omitted).
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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such homes for that class as well as other classes of individuals.2 t4 The
Court said that:
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the
government may legitimately take into account in a wide
range of decisions, and because both State and Federal
Governments have recently committed themselves to
assisting the retarded, we will not presume that any given
legislative action, even one that disadvantages retarded
individuals, is rooted in considerations that the
Constitution will not tolerate. 215
The Court found that the lesser standard of rational basis review was
appropriate, 1 6 but that even under that "lesser standard" the record did not
indicate any rational basis for believing that the [group] home would pose
any special threat, and thus the law was invalid as applied.2? 1 7 The Court
noted that "mere negative attitudes or fears" are inadequate to sustain such
differential treatment. '21 8
Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun concurred with the result
but dissented in several other respects. First, Justice Marshall writing for
the group, argued that:
'Cleburne's vague generalizations for classifying the
"feeble-minded" with drug addicts, alcoholics, and the
insane, and excluding them where the elderly, the ill, the
boarder, and the transient are allowed, are not substantial
or important enough to overcome the suspicion that the
ordinance rests on impermissible assumptions or outmoded
and perhaps invidious stereotypes....
Rather than leaving future retarded individuals to
run the gauntlet of this overbroad presumption, I would
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety
and would strike down on its face the provision at issue." 9

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

219.

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435.
Id. at 446.
Id.at 435.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id. at 464, 478 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Secondly, and quite presciently, Justice Marshall stated:
I cannot agree, however, with the way in which the
Court reaches its result or with the narrow, as-applied
remedy it provides for the city of 'Cleburne's equal
protection violation. The Court holds the ordinance invalid
on rational-basis grounds and disclaims that anything
special, in the form of heightened scrutiny, is taking place.
Yet 'Cleburne's ordinance surely would be valid under the
traditional rational-basis test applicable to economic and
commercial regulation....
The refusal to acknowledge that something more than
minimum rationality review is at work here is . .
unfortunate in at least two respects. The suggestion that
the traditional rational-basis test allows this sort of
searching inquiry creates precedent for . . . courts to
subject economic and commercial classifications to similar
and searching "ordinary" rational-basis review--a small
and regrettable step back toward the days of [Lochner].220
While it may not turn out to be "Lochnerizing," exactly, more
demanding judicial scrutiny may be in the offing for some forms of
"economic and social" legislation. There were concurring and dissenting
opinions as early as the 1940s arguing for the protection of economic
minorities through some form of heightened review, particularly where
invidious motives may have been at hand. Justice Douglas, for example,
221
voted to invalidate the regulations in Kotch v. Board of Riverboat Pilots
and Goessart v. Cleary.222 In those cases, the state was not just granting
benefits, but was perpetuating economic advantages for a favored group,
while disadvantaging other groups by reason of consanguinity or gender.
This was different than later cases, such as New Orleans v. Dukes, 3 where
the losers in the legislature, hot dog venders, where not permanently
disadvantaged minorities, and thus the need for judicial protection was
arguably less.224

220.
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 456, 459-60.
221.
330 U.S. 552 (1947).
222.
335 U.S. 464 (1948).
223.
427 U.S. 297 (1976).
224.
The principle of the Fourteenth Amendment is that there is a "constitutional
judgment that two individuals or groups are entitled to be treated equally.... With regard
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In the post-modem era, arguments for greater protection for
"economic or social policy minorities" have surfaced again. So has the
debate begun in 1949 in Railway Express Agency v. New York. In United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,225 for example, the Court
sustained an effort by Congress to reduce excess or "windfall" benefits to
railroad retirees by cutting benefits for those not actually working for the
railroad when these statutory benefits were enacted. Justice Rehnquist, for
the majority, conceded that the Court had "not been altogether consistent"
in deciding the standard of review 226in social and economic legislation
between Lindsley and Royster Guano.
Justice Stevens, concurring, suggested that while identification of an
actual purpose was not necessary, the Court should at least ascertain some
legitimate motivation proper for an impartial legislature.127 Any "adverse
impact" should have been viewable by the enacting Congress "as an
acceptable cost of achieving a larger goal. 22 8 Justices Brennan and
Marshall agreed with Justice Stevens. They noted in their dissent,
however, that the proper approach was to be found in Johnson v.
Robison,2290 where eight members of the Court agreed on the Royster Guano
23
standar.
IX. THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE: EMERGING TRENDS IN EQUAL
PROTECTION

Given the modem turmoil over standards of review, including the
proper approach to rational basis review of economic or social regulation, it
is not surprising that several recent federal court decisions have signaled
that a more demanding review of economic regulations may take hold.231
to economic and commercial matters, no basis for such a conclusion exists ... [because]
[t]he structure of economic and commercial life is a matter of political compromise, not
constitutional principle." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 470-71 (Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun,
JJ., concurring and dissenting).
225. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
226.
Id.at 174.
227.
Id. at 180-81.
228.
Id.at 181.
229.
415 U.S. 361 (1974).
230.
Fritz, 449 U.S. at 183.
See, e.g., Cornwell v. Cal. Bd. of Barbering, 962 F. Supp. 1260 (S.D. Cal.
231.
1997) (challenging a law requiring a cosmetology license to run a hair-braiding shop);
Brown v. Barry, 710 F. Supp. 352 (D.DC. 1989) (challenging a law prohibiting bootblack
stands on public space); Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp.2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000)
(requiring funeral director license to sell caskets) (cited and discussed in this symposium by
Timothy Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday's
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Timothy Sandefur explores this area in his provocative opening piece of the
issue.
On this fiftieth anniversary of the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,233 it would also seem appropriate to discuss still unresolved
issues in the area of segregation and affirmative action. Consequently, this
symposium offers Professor Mark Cordes' thoughts on the recent Grutter
and Gratz decisions and the future for race-conscience admissions
programs in higher education.234 Christopher J. Schmidt makes the case
against Justice O'Connor's intriguing suggestion, in those cases, that
affirmative action in higher education will most likely be unnecessary in
twenty-five years.23 5 Michael Fridkin explores a different possible
implication of Grutter and Gratz, that a path may now be open to nonremedial justifications for racial preferences not just in public education but
also in allocating public benefits. 236 The future of school desegregation
litigation is the focus of the article by Judge P. Michael Mahoney and Scott
Paccagnini.237
This issue also contains intriguing articles about a topic currently in
the news-same-sex marriage. Professor Mark Wojcik examines the
potential impact of these marriages on our institutions of culture, arguing
that it would be irrational to not afford same-sex marriages the same
respect as opposite-sex couples.238 Professor Robert Laurence, also looking
to the battles ahead for recognition of same-sex marriage, offers insights
that might be gleaned from hundreds of years of conflict between Indian
tribes and the North American dominant society. 9
Finally, the
symposium includes a discussion of the protection of Indian cultural

RationalityReview Isn't Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 457 (2004)).

232.
Sandefur, supra note 23 1.
233.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
234.
Mark Cordes, Affirmative Action After Grutterand Gratz, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
691 (2004).
235.
Christopher J. Schmidt, Caught in a Paradox: Problems with Grutter's
Expectation that Race-Conscious Admissions Programs will end in 25 Years, 24 N. ILL. U.
L. REv. 753 (2004).
236.
Michael K. Fridkin, The Permissibility of Non-Remedial Justifications for
Racial Preferencesin Public Contracting,24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 509 (2004).
237.
P. Michael Mahoney & Scott Paccagnini, Declare Victory and Go Home: The
PracticalRamifications of the Seventh Circuit's Interpretation of Missouri v. Jenkins in
School DesegregationCases, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 683 (2004).
238.
Mark E. Wojcik, The Wedding Bells Heard Around the World: Years From
Now, Will We Wonder Why We Worried About Same-Sex Marriage?,24 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
589 (2004).
239.
Robert Laurence, What Could American Indian Law Possibly Have to Do with
the Issue of Gay-MarriageRecognition?: Definition Jurisprudence,Equal Protection and
Full Faith and Credit, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 563 (2004).
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property as compared to that of other minorities.24
symposium promises to be a stimulating read.
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All in all, this

240.
Sherry Hutt, If Geronimo Was Jewish: Equal Protection and the Cultural
Property Rights of Native Americans, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527 (2004).

